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CRYPTOSYSTEMS USING SUBGROUP DISTORTION
INDIRA CHATTERJI, DELARAM KAHROBAEI, AND NI YEN LU
Abstract. In this paper we propose cryptosystems based on sub-
group distortion in hyperbolic groups. We also include concrete
examples of hyperbolic groups as possible platforms.
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1. Introduction
Using algorithmic problems in non-commutative groups for cryp-
tography is a fairly new but very active field for over a decade (see
for instance [9]). In this paper we propose new cryptosystems using
subgroup distortion. The algorithmic problems which are proposed
for non-commutative group-based cryptography so far are: Conju-
gacy Search Problem, Endomorphism Search Problem, Word Choice
problem, Membership search problem and Twisted Conjugacy Problem
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among others. There has not been yet any proposal to use the Geodesic
Length Problem or Complexity of Distortion in Subgroups as we do in
this paper. We propose a couple of symmetric cryptosystems based on
these problems, and analyze their security.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.1 we discuss the
notion of subgroup distortion and in Section 2.2 we discuss the problem
of finding the geodesic length of an element in a group in polynomial
time, and explain how in a Gromov hyperbolic group this can be done
in polynomial time. In Section 3 we explain two possible protocols
based on subgroup distortion, and in Section 4 we give a few concrete
examples of hyperbolic groups that can be used as platforms for the
cryptosystems described in Section 3.
2. Basics group theory facts
2.1. Subgroup distortion. Let G be a finitely generated group and
S ⊆ G a finite generating set. Then for g ∈ G the word length associ-
ated to S is given by
ℓS(g) = min{n ∈ N|g = s1 . . . sn, si ∈ S ∪ S
−1}
For any two finite generating sets S, S ′ of G, there is a constant C ≥ 1
such that, for any g ∈ G one has
ℓS(g) ≤ CℓS′(g).
For H < G a finitely generated subgroup, if T ⊂ H is a generating set,
then for any h ∈ H
ℓS∪T (h) ≤ ℓT (h).
Indeed, there are “shortcuts” to the identity when one is allowed to use
both elements from the generating set from G and H . Those shortcuts
may no longer be there when we are restricted to the generating set of
H and hence the other inequality is in general not true. By how much
this other inequality fails is how one defines the distortion. In the rest
of the paper we will assume that T ⊆ S, so that S ∪ T = S.
Definition 2.1. Let G be a finitely generated group and H < G be a
finitely generated subgroup. The distortion of H in G is a function
Dist
G
H : N → N
n 7→ max{ℓT (h) | ℓS(h) ≤ n}
Notice that a priori this function depends on the generating sets S
and T for G and H , but two finite generating sets will give equiva-
lent distortion functions, that is functions that differ by multiplicative
constants.
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The following are very natural examples of finitely generated groups
with distorted subgroups.
Example 2.2. The metabelian Baumslag-Solitar group:
G = BS(1, 2) = 〈a, b | aba−1 = b2〉
If we take H ≃ Z = 〈b〉, then one checks that for any n ∈ N one has
anba−n = an−1b2a−(n−1) = an−1ba−1aba−(n−1) = an−2b4a−(n−2)
= · · · = b2
n
Hence ℓ{b}(b
2n) = 2n whereas ℓ{a,b}(b
2n) = 2n + 1 so that DistGH is at
least an exponential.
Example 2.3. The integer Heisenberg group, given by
G = HZ = 〈a, b, c | [a, c] = [b, c] = e, [a, b] = c〉
If we take H ≃ Z = 〈c〉, this is the center of G and then one checks
that for any n ∈ N, using that ab = cba and that a−1b−1 = cb−1a−1 one
has
anbna−nb−n = an−1abbn−1a−nb−n = an−1cbabn−1a−nb−n
= can−1babn−1a−nb−n = can−1b2cabn−2a−nb−n
= c2an−1b2abn−2a−nb−n = · · · = cnan−1bna−n+1b−n
= · · · = c2nan−2bna−n+2b−n = · · · = cn
2
bnb−n = cn
2
And hence ℓ{c}(c
n2) = n2 whereas ℓ{a,b,c}(c
n2) = 4n so that DistGH is at
least a polynomial.
2.2. The Geodesic Length Problem. Given a finitely generated
group G and a finite generating set S, one can ask the following.
Question 1 (Geodesic Length Problem). What is the complexity of
the algorithm that given g ∈ G, finds the geodesic length ℓS(g)?
This question seems hard in general, and not much studied. In [7]
it is shown that this problem is NP-complete in the free-metabelian
group Sr,2. It is also known that in free groups or Right Angled Artin
groups given by standard generating sets, there are fast algorithms
for computing the geodesic length of elements [9]. In braid groups, or
nilpotent groups, the computation of the geodesic length of elements
is hard [9].
There are many groups of exponential growth where the Geodesic
Problem is decidable in polynomial time, for example, hyperbolic
groups [4] or metabelian Baumslag-Solitar group BS(1,n), [2]. Notice
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that, a priori, the Geodesic Problem is a bit harder than the Geodesic
Length Problem: indeed, once one has found a geodesic, one automat-
ically has its length, but knowing the length of a geodesic doesn’t give
the geodesic. However, according to Elder and Rechnitzer in [3], those
two problems are polynomially reducible to each other, meaning that
a polynomial time solution to one of the problems is equivalent to a
polynomial time solution to the other one.
In the case where G is hyperbolic in the sense of Gromov, the fol-
lowing is easy:
Theorem 2.4 (Epstein et al [4]). Let G be a Gromov hyperbolic group,
then the Geodesic Problem (hence the Geodesic Length Problem as well)
is solvable in polynomial time.
Proof. According to [1] (Part III.Γ.2), in a Gromov hyperbolic group
a word has a normal form which is a quasi-geodesic, so one can check
by hand in a neighborhood of this quasi-geodesic to find the geodesic
length, and the neighborhood of a quasi-geodesic is the same as a neigh-
borhood of a geodesic according to Morse lemma. 
Tim Riley’s alternative argument is that for hyperbolic groups, one
can transform an arbitrary path into a local (for the right definition of
local) geodesic in polynomial time and then conclude it is a geodesic.
2.3. The membership search problem. Given G a finitely gener-
ated group, with a finite generating set S and H a subgroup with its
own generating set T , one can ask the following.
Question 2 (Membership search problem). Given h ∈ H expressed
in terms of the generating set S, how long is it needed to express h in
terms of elements of T?
The difficulty of the membership search problem has been used in
cryptography by Shpilrain and Zapata in [10], but here we will be need-
ing examples in which the membership search problem is polynomial,
see Lemma 4.1.
3. The Cryptosystems Using Subgroup Distortion
3.1. The protocol I: basic idea. Assume that Alice and Bob would
like to communicate over an insecure channel. Here G = 〈g1, · · · , gl|R〉
is a public group and H = 〈t1, · · · , ts〉 ⊂ 〈g1, · · · , gl〉 = G is a secret
subgroup of G, that is distorted and shared between only between
Alice and Bob. We further assume that the geodesic length problem is
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polynomial both in G and H , and that the membership search problem
is polynomial in H . Then:
(1) Alice picks h ∈ H with ℓH(h) = n, expresses h in terms of
generators of G with ℓG(h) = m≪ n and sends h to Bob.
(2) Bob then converts h back in terms of generators of H and com-
putes ℓH(g) = n in polynomial time to recover n.
3.1.1. Security. Although H is not known to anyone except to Alice
and Bob and h being sent with length m ≪ n gives infinitely many
possible guesses for the eavesdropper Eve, the security of the scheme is
weak since Eve will have intercepted enough elements of H to generate
H (one can think of the group Z of the integers, it is enough to intercept
two relatively prime integers to generate the whole group).
3.2. The protocol I: secure version. We suggest making it impos-
sible for Eve to tell which elements in the sent form belong to H by
sending along h several elements that do not belong toH . To determine
how Bob can tell which elements belong to H to retrieve the correct
message we will consider below the subgroup membership problem and
the random number generator.
3.2.1. Subgroup membership problem. Suppose we have a group in
which the subgroup membership problem is solved efficiently then we
will send some random words and the receiver first checks whether each
word belongs to H and then computes its length.
Protocol:
Let G = 〈g1, · · · , gl|RG〉 be a group that is known to the public and
H = 〈h1, · · · , hs〉 be a secret subgroup of G that is exponentially dis-
torted. Assume that the subgroup membership problem in G efficiently
solvable, and that as in Protocol I the word problem is polynomial in
G, the geodesic length problem and the membership problems are both
polynomial in H . Then:
(1) Alice picks h ∈ H with ℓH(h) = n, expresses h = g1 · · · gm in
terms of generators of G with ℓG(h) = m ≪ n. She randomly
generates a0, . . . , am ∈ G \H and sends these words to Bob.
(2) Since Bob knows the generating set for H , he find h ∈ H (since
he could check the subgroup membership problem efficiently)
he only uses h ∈ H , in terms of generators of H and computes
ℓH(g) = n in polynomial time according to our assumptions to
recover n.
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3.2.2. Random Number Generator. Suppose we have a random number
generator and two parties that share the same random number gener-
ator and the same seed, they will get a same random sequence. We
would like to use this idea but instead on groups.
This notion is possible if we are given a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the countably infinite set of integers and a countably infinite
group G. There is a natural ordering of elements in the group of inte-
gers and so we can impose this ordering on G. Generating m random
numbers is the same as generating m elements in group G.
The advantage here is that given the same random number generator
and the same seed, two parties would produce the same sequence of
random numbers and by using the ”same ordering” in G, they would
get the same sequence of random elements of G.
According to Cayley’s theorem, every group is isomorphic to a permu-
tation group. There is a lexicographic ordering on permutation groups
and hence there is a unique ordering of any group. There is a one-
to-one correspondence between the group of integers and a countably
infinitely group. We will use the idea of random number generator for
group in the protocol below.
Protocol:
Let G = D1 ∗D2 ∗· · ·∗Dn where each Di is a Gromov hyperbolic group
that is known to the public. Alice and Bob share H = 〈d, · · · , ds〉 ⊂
D1 := 〈d1, · · · , dl|R1〉 which is an exponentially distorted hyperbolic
subgroup of D1 (and hence G), a random number generator, and a way
to choose a seed. (For example, they could use the date and time for the
seed : 02032016123342 where 02-03-2016 is today date and 12:33:42pm
is the current time of message being sent. They could also add to this
the number sent by previous message.)
(1) Alice picks h ∈ H with ℓH(h) = n, expresses h = d1 · · · dm in
terms of generators of D1 with ℓG(h) = m≪ n. She randomly
generates a sequence of (m+1) numbers from the random num-
ber generator and picks a0, . . . , am that belong to D2 ∗ · · · ∗Dn
that is in a one-to-one correspondence with the sequence of
(m + 1) numbers.1 She then sends a0d1a1d2 . . . dmam to Bob
(the ai’s are expressed in a fixed generating set for D2∗· · ·∗Dn).
(2) Bob knows the random number generator and the seed so he
knows which ai’s are sent along with h. He uses ai’s inverses
to get back h = d1 · · · dm. Since he also knows H , he converts
1According to Cayley’s theorem, every group is isomorphic to a permutation
group so we can use the lexicographic ordering of permutation group and then
order the product D2 ∗ · · · ∗Dm lexicographically.
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h back in terms of generators of H and computes ℓH(g) = n in
polynomial time according to Theorem 2.4 to recover n.
3.2.3. Security. The security of the scheme relies on the fact that:
• H < G is not known to anyone except to Alice and Bob.
• Since h is sent with length ℓG(h) = m≪ n, there are infinitely
many guesses for Eve that are greater than m.
• For both protocols, only Bob can tell which elements sent in the
form of h belong to H . For the second protocol, the random
number generator and the seed are known to only Alice and
Bob, so there is no way for Eve to tell which elements among
{h, ai} belong to H to try to generate H .
3.3. The protocol II: basic idea. Let G = 〈S|R1〉 be a secret group
that is only known only to Alice and Bob and that has polynomial
geodesic length problem. Let H = 〈T 〉 be a public distorted subgroup
of G. Here T is a subset of S.
(1) Alice wants to send a message n ∈ N to Bob. She picks g ∈ G
with ℓG(g) = n. She then expresses g = t1t2t3 · · · tm, where
m≫ n and t′is ∈ T and sends to Bob.
(2) Bob converts g back in terms of generators of G and by assump-
tion computes its length in polynomial time to recover n.
3.3.1. Security. Although G is not known to anyone except Alice and
Bob, the security of this scheme is not strong since the eavesdropper
could potentially guess the value of n based on the upper bound m.
3.4. The protocol II: secure version. Instead of sending g with
ℓG(g) = m≫ n we can embed H exp(exp) distorted in another group
K so that we can transmit message of size ≤ log n < m. For the
cryptosystem below, we need the following groups:
G = 〈g1, · · · , gl|RG〉
H = 〈h1, h2, · · · , hk|RH〉
K = 〈k1, · · · , kq|RK〉
where H is a distorted subgroup of G and embedded exp(exp) distorted
in K. The group H is known to the public whereas G and K are known
to only Alice and Bob.
(1) Alice wants to send a message n ∈ N to Bob. She picks g ∈ G
with ℓG(g) = n, g = g1g2 · · · gn.
Since H is distorted in G, there is m > n with ℓH(g) = m.
Alice then expresses g = h1h2 . . . hm, in terms of generators of
H .
8 I. CHATTERJI, D. KAHROBAEI, AND N. Y. LU
SinceH is embedded exp(exp) distorted inK, there exist p≪≪
m and k1, k2, · · ·kp in the generating set of K such that g =
k1k2 · · · kp.
Alice sends g in this form to Bob.
(2) Bob will do the following:
He uses his knowledge of K and H and the fact H is exp(exp)
in K to convert g = k1k2 · · · kp(p≪ m) to g = h1h2 . . . hm.
Since he knows that H is distorted in G, he converts g =
h1h2 . . . hm to g = g1g2 . . . gn back in terms of generators of
G. He then computes the length of h to recover n.
3.4.1. Security. The security of the scheme relies on the fact that find-
ing the geodesic length problem in H for the eavesdropper is impossible
due to the fact that:
• G and K are not known to anyone except to Alice and Bob.
• g is sent in terms of generators of K so there is no way for Eve
to figure out H .
• With ℓK(g) = p≪ n, there are infinitely many choices of num-
bers greater than p for guessing.
4. Possible platforms
For both protocols, Gromov hyperbolic groups seem to provide inter-
esting platforms. Indeed, according to Theorem 2.4 the geodesic length
problem is solvable in polynomial time. There are many examples of
hyperbolic groups with exponentially distorted hyperbolic subgroups,
see for instance [6] for geometric examples such as surface subgroups
in fundamental groups of hyperbolic 3-manifolds, but we do not know
about membership search problems there.
4.1. Free-by-cyclic platforms for protocol I. One possible weak-
ness of Protocol I is that the public group G does not contain enough
exponentially distorted subgroups H , so Eve could make a group the-
oretic search and find all the distorted subgroups. To avoid that
problem, one could use hyperbolic groups which can be written as
free-by-cyclic groups in infinitely many ways. Such groups are con-
structed in [5]. More precisely, the authors construct groups G which
are hyperbolic, and have infinitely many homomorphisms to Z, with
free kernel. Given any such homomorphism, one has an expression
G = Fn(a1, . . . , an) ⋊φ 〈t〉, where the first factor is the free group on
the generators a1, . . . , an, and φ is an automorphism of Fn(a1, . . . , an)
such that tait
−1 = φ(ai) for all i.
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We fix one such G = Fn(a1, . . . , an) ⋊φ 〈t〉 (including a choice of
generators a1, . . . , an, t) as the public group G.
Now Alice and Bob together choose one of the (infinitely many)
other homomorphisms of G to Z, say G = Fm(b1, . . . , bm) ⋊ 〈s〉 and
take H = Fm(b1, . . . , bm) < G.
Lemma 4.1. The membership search problem for H < G is solvable
in polynomial time.
Proof. Given a word w = w(a1, . . . , an, t) a word in the public genera-
tors a1, . . . , an, t of G, which represents an element h ∈ H , we need to
show that there is a polynomial time algorithm to write h in terms of
the generators b1, . . . , bm of H .
Since G = Fn(a1, . . . , an)⋊φ 〈t〉 = Fm(b1, . . . , bm) ⋊ 〈s〉, each ai can
be written as a word in b1, . . . , bm, s. Thus by hyperbolicity, w can be
changed into a word v = v(b1, . . . , bm, s) in real time, and there is a
constant K, depending only on H , such that |v| ≤ K|w|.
The word v may have some powers of s and s−1, but since it repre-
sents the element h of H , it has an expression u which is a word in just
b1, . . . bm. Applying Britton’s lemma to u
−1v, we see that v must have
an innermost s, s−1 pair: i.e., v must have a subword of the form sxs−1
or s−1xs, where x is a word in just b1, . . . bm. Replace this subword
with φ(x) or φ−1(x) respectively, to get a word v1 representing h with
fewer s’s and s−1’s than v. Continuing this procedure, after finitely
many steps we will have written down an expression for h in terms of
b1, . . . , bm. Applying the automorphism involves multiplication in the
group, which is polynomial. Moreover, the number of steps is bounded
above by the number of s, s−1 pairs, which is at most |v|/2 < K|w|. 
4.2. Exponential and Exp(exp) distortion for protocol II.
We now provide concrete examples of hyperbolic groups with an
exponentially and an exp(exp) distorted subgroup that could be
used in protocol II (improved version). Those examples are a
particular case of the more general techniques developed in [8].
Here we describe a specific type which may fit our needs, although
it is not clear that they have a fast enough membership search problem.
Let
G1 := 〈a1, a2, · · · , a14, t1|t
−1
1 ajt1 = w1j(1 ≤ j ≤ 14)〉
and
G14 := 〈a1, a2, · · · , a142 , t1, · · · , t14|t
−1
i ajti = wij(1 ≤ i ≤ 14, 1 ≤ j ≤ 14
2)〉
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where w1j’s are positive words on aj ’s, of length 14 such that aiaj
appears at most once as a subword of w1j and similarly for wij. We
obtain w1j by noting that the following word
(a1a1a2a1a3a1 · · · a14)(a2a2a3a2 · · · a14) · · · (a13a13a14)a14
has length 142 so we can split it into 14 subwords of length 14, each
corresponding to w1j .
4.3. Exponentially Distorted Subgroups. The subgroup
F1 := 〈a1, · · · , a14〉
is free of rank 14 and is exponentially distorted in G1.
Here is an example. The word t−n1 a1t
n
1 has length 2n+ 1 in G1. On
the other hand,
t−n1 a1t
n
1 = t
−n+1
1 t
−1
1 a1t1t
n−1
1 = t
−n+1
1 w11t
n−1
1
= t−n+11 a1a1a2a1 · · · a7a1t
n−1
1
= t−n+21 t
−1
1 a1t1t
−1
1 a2 · · · t
−1
1 a7t1t
−1
1 a1t1t
n−2
1
= t−n+21 w11w11w12 · · ·w17w11t
n−2
1
= · · · a
(1)
j · · ·
Since lG1(t
−n
1 a1t
n
1 ) = 2n+1 and lF1(t
−n
1 a1t
n
1 ) = 14
n, the subgroup F1
is at least exponentially distorted in G1.
4.4. Exponentially Exponentially Distorted Subgroups. Define
H := G1 ∗F1 G14. Denote
F1 := 〈a
(1)
1 , · · · , a
(1)
14 〉
and
F2 := 〈a
(2)
1 , · · · , a
(2)
14 , · · · , a
(2)
142〉.
Let w1 = t
−na
(1)
1 t
n and
w2 = w
−1
1 a
(2)
1 w1 where a
(2)
1 ∈ F2 and w1 ∈ F1
= (t−na
(1)
1 t
n)−1a
(2)
1 t
−na(1)tn ∈ H
= (· · · a
(1)
j · · · )
−1a
(2)
1 (· · · a
(1)
j · · · )
= (· · · tj · · · )
−1a
(2)
1 (· · · tj · · · )
= = · · · a
(2)
k · · ·
where the third equality follows by the previous computation and
the fourth equality follows since F1 is identified with the subgroup
of G14 generated by 〈t1, · · · , t14〉. There are 14
n elements in each of
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(· · ·a
(1)
j · · · ) so 14
n tj ’s on each side of a
(2)
1 . Since lH(w2) = 4n+ 2 and
lF2(w2) = 14
14n , F2 is at least exp(exp) distorted in H .
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